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CLARIFICATION OF

FAC~~

In its Brief, Respondent Tanglewood SLC Associates, Ltd.
fails to note that on October 1, 1980, Swapp filed answers to
the Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories (Record, page 75),
which is probative of the fact that Swapp responded to discovery
in the period prior to his abandonment by his former attorney,
who unofficially withdrew from this case.
Further, Swapp has

testified~

by uncontroverted Affidavit,

that he was never contacted by his former attorney with regard
to the Respondent's discovery requests filed after April 2, 1981,
and that Swapp had no knowledge of the existence or significance
of the following documents:
(1)

The Interrogatories of Plaintiff Ritchie (Record, page

(2)

The Request for Documents of Plaintiff Ritchie (Record,

. 192) ;

page 195);
(3)

The Interrogatories of Defendant Tanglewood (Record,

page 207);
(4)

The Request for Documents of Defendant Tanglewood

(Record, page 204);
( 5)

The Notice of Deposition by Defendant Tanglewood

(Record, page 2 30)
(6)

i

The Amended Notice of Deposition by Defendant Tanglewood

(Record, page 23 4 );
(7)

The Stipulation regarding future discovery by De-

fendant Tanglewood (Record, page 247);
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(8)

The Motion to Compel Discovery by Defendant

Tanglewood (Record, page 256);
(9)

The Order granting the Motion to Compel (Record,

page 267);
(10)

The Default Certificate against Swapp filed by

Tanglewood (Record, page 271);
(11)

The Motion to Strike Swapp's pleadings by Tanglewood

(Record, page 276);
(12)

The Order striking Swapp's pleadings (Record,

page 272);
(13)

The Default Judgment against Swapp by Tanglewood

(Record, page 279);
(14)

The Order in Supplemental Proceedings of July 10,

1981 (Record, page 283);
(15)

The Settlement Stipulation between the other parties

(Record, -page 285);
(16)

The Order in Supplemental Proceedings of August

13, 1982 (Record, page 288).
Furthermore, it is clear from the record that the Order
in Supplemental Proceedings dated July 9th/10th, 1981 (Record,
pages 283 and 288) was never served on Swapp, and that
therefore it is without legal significance and effect.
Moreover, the Order in Supplemental Proceedings signed October
14, 1981 and filed with the Court on September 3, 1981 (Record,
page 290) was served at the residence of Swapp upon his son

-3-
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(Record, page 292) at a time when Swapp was still under the
impression that he was being represented by his attorney.
By way of further clarification, Swapp draws the

attention of the Court to the fact that the Respondent, in
its answering brief, suggests that Swapp was dilatory in
bringing his Motion to Set Aside the Default Certificate and
Default Judgment.

The record, however, shows the contrary.

The first service of a post-judgment writ or order made
upon Swapp personally was an Order to Show Cause and some
execution papers, served upon him on September 22, 1981 (Record,
pages 294, 296, and 321).

Within ten days after this service,

Swapp apprised himself of the fact that he had been abandoned
by his former attorney and sought the assistance of new
counsel.

New counsel appeared with Swapp at the Order to

Show Cause hearing (Record, page 294) held on October 2, 1981.
Only nine days elapsed between September 22, 1981 (when Swapp
was first personally served with an Order to Show Cause and
some execution papers) and October l, 1981 · (when Swapp rstained
new counsel).

Within that nine day period, Swapp acted

with dispatch in obtaining counsel and in bringing his Motion
to set Aside the Default Certificate and the Default Judgment.
Furthermore, Respondent rnischaracterizes Swapp's brief.
Swapp never said in his brief (page 5) that he "first became
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aware of the judgment on October 1, 1981, when an execution
was served" (see Tanglewood's answering brief, page 4).
What Swapp state<l was,

"Swapp first became aware of his

dilemma on or about October 1, 1981, only after receiving
execution papers on his wife's real property" (see Swapp's
brief, page 5).

Swapp had never been told of his
,_

status as a judgment debtor and had assumed he was being
represented in the lawsuit by his former attorney, Steven
D. Luster.

Swapp, therefore, assumed that copies of the

papers served upon him (which papers he did not understand)
were also being served upon his lawyer whom Swapp thought was
representing him and taking care of these matters.

Swapp

never understood his "dilemma" (i.e., that he was not being
represented, that he had been abandoned, and that he was responsible personally for answering the orders being served
upon him) until on or about October 1, 1981.
The Record on Appeal and the Affidavit of Swapp, filed in
support of his Motion to Set Aside the Default and Default
Judgment (Record, pages 302, 304 and 306) support this
interpretation of the facts.
REBUTTAL ARGUMENTS
In spite of Respondent's assertions to the contrary,
the abuse of discretion of the trial court in this case is
clearly shown by the transcript of the hearing on Swapp's
Motion to Set Aside the Default and Default Judgment and the
hearing on the Motion to Vacate and Quash the Execution (Record,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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page 333).

The transcript of that hearing shows that, though

the Court clearly stated its reasons for denying the plaintiff's
Motion to Vacate and Quash the Execution, the Court did not
clearly state its grounds for denying Swapp's Motion to Set
Aside the Default and Default Judgment, which Motion had been
made pursuant to ~ule 60(b) (7), inter alia, of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The whole question in this case is whether or not the
kind of abandonment or unofficial withdrawal by an attorney that
occurred in this case comes under Rule 60(b) (1) as

11

negligence

11

imputable to the client and the remedy for which is a Motion
To Set Aside to be made within three months from the entry of
judgment, or whether it is "negligence" which constitutes "any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment 1
under Rule 60(b)(7) which would not be imputable to the client
and the remedy for which is a Motion To Set Aside to be made
within a reasonable time of the entry of judgment (as opposed
to within three months).

The transcript of the hearing (Record,

page 333) indicates that the trial court did not make this
distinction in-stating its reasons for denying Swapp's motion
to set aside, nor did it address itself to the "reasonable time"
language of Rule 60(b)(7).
Respondent argues that Swapp's former attorney committed
Rule 60(b) (1) "negligence," and suggests that any other finding
would result in an evisceration of the three-month time limit
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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governing motions to set aside under Rule 60(b) (1).
Respondent,

For, argues

if every mistake can be characterized as "any

other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment," then every motion to set aside a judgment will
be made under Rule 60(b) (7), and the three-month time limit will
have no force or meaning.
also be made:

However, the converse argument can

If every "negligence" or impropriety of an

attorney is characterized as "negligence" within the meaning
/

of Rule 60(b)(l), there can be no wrong perpetrated by a lawyer
against his client that will ever amount to "any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."

Thus,

Rule 60(b)(7) will have little, if any, force or meaning.
Appellant argues that there must be a middle ground; there
must be a principal of differentiation between the "negligence"
or "mistake" treated under Rule 60(b) (1) and the "negligence"
that might be treated under Rule 60(b)(7) as "any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
The point of differentiation turns upon the notice to
the judgment debtor that he is, in fact,

a judgment debtor.

For the three-month rule to operate fairly, the judgment
debtor should either have knowledge of or have no good cause
for failing to know of the judgment entered against him.

A

party can be said to either know of or have no good cause for
failing to know of a judgment entered against him in a situation
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where he either chooses to represent himself or when he
chooses to retain an attorney who is actively representing
him.

A judgment entered against such a person should not

be set aside beyond the three-month limitation which applies
to Rule 60(b) (1) because such a judgment debtor or his attorney
should have notice of any judgment entered against

h~m.

Even

if such a judgment were entered against him because his attorney
plead the wrong defenses, missed filing deadlines or otherwise
mishandled the case, the judgment should stand unless set
aside for good cause on a motion made within three months under
Rule 60(b)(l).

The reason for this is that the "negligence

11

involved in pleading wrong defenses, missing deadlines, or
otherwise mishandling the case amounts to "negligence" committed
during the representation of a client.

Such negligence ought

to be imputable to the client becuase it is a risk which every
client assumes in hiring an attorney, or in the alternative,
in representing himself.

But the "negligence" that results in

an attorney's abandonment of a client's cause is another matter.
This latter type is not "negligence" committed during the
representation of a client's cal.lse.

It is "negligence" resulting

from the failure of an attorney to represent his client at all.
It amounts to the abandonment of a client, to the unofficial
withdrawal of the attorney, to the failure of an attorney to
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actively pursue his client's cause of ~ction or defenses.

This

type of "negligence" should not be imputed to the client because the client, at the time he hires his attorney, does not
assume the risk of abandonment although he l:'lay assume the risk
- of poor representation.
This distinction makes sense in light of the time limits
of Rule 60(b).
three months.

A Rule 60(b)(l) motion must be made within
This is fair because, when actively represented,

a client will within that period either know about the
judgment entered against him or will have no good reason for
not knowing about it.

But a client who has been abanonded may

very well not know the status of his case: he may even
believe tha.t his .;,ttorney has been zealously representi.r1g him,
whe!l, on the contrary, he has been abandoned, a judgment may
already have been entered against him, and the three-month
time limit of Rule 60(b)(l) may have already run out.
The only problem with this analysis arises when an attorney
misses a filing or discovery deadline during the representation
of his client.

In other words,

in a situation where an

attorney, has NOT abandoned his client, but has failei to answer
pleading and a default is entered as a result, the party
injured by that attorney's "negligence" could theoretically
claim "abandonment" under Rule 60(b)(7).

Thus, any

f~ilure

by an attorney to meet a pleading deadline or to appear at
a heaz-ing could be deemed an "abandonment."

The effect of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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this would be to destroy the distinction between the Rule 60(b) (1)
"negligence" committed during representation and Rule 60(b) (7)
"negligence" resulting from the true abandomnent by an attorney
of his client's case.

For this reason, any party claiming

"abandonment" under Rule 60(b) (7) must be required to make
a showing that the attorney's "negligence

11

is not simply a

mistake made during representation, but that it constitutes
an aggrevated pattern of attorney impropriety amounting to
an unofficial withdrawal from the case and an abandonment of
the client's cause.
In this present case, Swapp's former attorney's failure
to represent Swapp did not amount to the missing of one or two
pleading deadlines or a hearing, or to mistakes made durins
the representation of Swapp.

It constituted an aggrevated

pattern of impropriety amounting to the abandonment of a client:
Swapp's former attorney failed to notify his client of discovery
requirements, of depositions, of a stipulation for further
discovery, of a motion to compel, of a motion to strike, of a
default certificate and finally of the default judgment.

The

record also shows that Swapp's former attorney made no
attempt to set aside the defa.11lt o-E his client.

These acts

-10-
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and omissions do not constitute "negligence" committed during
the representation of a client, but to an an unofficial
withdrawal from this case and an abandonment of Swapp's claims
and defenses.
T"he distinction which the appellant asserts here is not
without foundation in law.

A number of courts have treated

the abandonment of a client or the unofficial withdrawal by
an attorney as "any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of a judgment" under Rule 60(b) (7).

The leading

case, Buckert vs. Briggs, 15 Cal. App. 3rd 296, 93 Cal.

~ptr.

61 (1971), was cited in crossclaimant-appellant Swapp's Appeal
Brief (pages 9 and 12).
The leading case in the Utah jurisdiction is Interstate
Excavating v.

A~la

Developme~t

, 611 P.2d. 396 (Ut. 1980), cited

on page 11 of Swapp's Appeal Brief.
Furthermore, the cases which the Respondent has cited
in its answering brief also demonstrate both the legality
and propriety of distinguishing between "negligence" committed
during the course of legal representation under Rule 60(b)(l)
from the "negligence" resulting from abandonment or unofficial
withdrawal by an attorney, constituting "any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment," under
Rule 60(b)(7):
1.

For example, in Nederlandsche __I:!C!ndel -

Maa!:sc_h:~ppij

N. M.

v. Jay EJ'":lr.1, Inc., 301 F. 2d. 114 (2d Cir. 1962), the negligence
did not amount to abandonment or unofficial withdrawal, but was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the kind of excusable negligence attorneys sometimes commit
in their profession and which is imputable to their clients.
The time limit of Rule 60(b) (1) should and did apply in this
case.

The client need not consent to all an attorney does for

him to be bound by what that attorney does.

Because a client

pays his attorney to act for him, the client is bound
by his attorneys acts on his behalf.
an attorney to abandon him.

BUt a client does not hire

Therefore, a client cannot be

responsible for the unofficial withdrawal of his attorney
(especially if he is unaware of it).
2.

In the case of Golan v. Central Intelligence Agency,

607 F. 339 (DoC. Cir. 1978), the Court included dicta stating
that there must be "extraordinary" circumstances to obtain
relief under Federal Rule 60(b) (6)

(which is comparable to

Utah Rule 60(b)(7)). Those "extraordinary" circumstances
exist in this case where Swapp was virtu.3. l ly abandoned by his
attorney and where the "negligence" involved was not the
"excusable" or even "inexcusable" negligence committe·-.1 by an
attorney actively forwarding his client's cc=\se.
3.

In the case of Pitts v. McClaughlin, 567 P.2d. 171

(Ut. 1977), the trial court denied a Motion for relief from a
summary Judgment, and on appeal the Supreme Court of Utah
affirmed the judgment

o~

the trial court.

But the Supreme Court

stated categorically that "we express no opinion as to the
rights of plaintiffs and defendants and third parties
in any other

l~tigation,

but are convinced that Rule 60(b) (1)
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is dispositive here, and that the circumstances prevailing
in the instant case are not subject for relief under 60(b) (7)."
Thus, this case, because it is one that turns upon certain
peculiar and specific facts, cannot be used as precedent.
It is clear, however,

from the language of the opinion that

in order for Rule 60(b)(7) to take affect, something other
than "mistake" or "inadvertance" must be asserted as grounds.
Mere "inadvertance" alone will not serve as "any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."

It is

Swapp's contention that, in his case, those "extraordinary"
and independent grounds exist.
4.

Similarly, in the case of Serzvsko v. Chase Manhatten

Bank, 461 F. 699 (2d Cir. 1972), the decision of the
Court not to apply Rules 60(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (which are virtually identical to the provisions
of Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure), turned
upon the particular facts of that case.

There the party

seeking relief from the judgment made its Motion to Set Aside
after the expiration of the one-year time limit set by the
Federal Rules (which is comparable to the three-month
time limit in the Utah Rules).

However, the Court determined

that the facts of the case did not rise to the level of "a
fraud upon the Court" which would invoke the residual clause
of R.ule 60 (b) ( 6) thus obviating the need to comply '-vi th the
one-year time limit.

This is another case that turns uoon
.i;
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facts different from those in the Swapp case.
5.

In the case of Southern Bond Company v. Teel,

550 P.2d. 571 (Okl. 1976), the Court affirmed the decision

of the trial court denying defendant's Motion for relief from
the Judgment.

But in that case, the Court specifically noted

that the attorney's failure to appear on behalf of his client
was not due to att9rney "abandonment."

The Court stated:

"There is no allegation in the petition to affect
Woolsey's attorney had abandoned him.
Generally attorney's ignorance, or mistake, or
apprehension not occasioned by adverse party,
does not constitute grounds for vacating a judgment
. . . . . An attorney's negligence while representing
client is imputable to the client as negligence and
does not constitute Unavoidable casualty and misfortune" justifying vacation of judgment under
statute."
Although the Court here denied the Motion to Set Aside,

it

suggested very clearly that its grounds for so doing were that
the defendant's attorneys "negligence" was committed during
the representation of his client, as opposed to the "negligence
resulting from client abandonment or unofficial withdrawal.
6.

In Stafford

v~-~ickison,

374 P.2d. 665 (Ha. 1962),

a defendant was defaulted and judgment entered against him
for failure to appear at a pretrial.

The trial court ordered:

Under the circumstances default judgment will
be entered to take effect thirty days from this
day during which period the defendant shall have

-14-
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11

the opportunity to move to have it set aside.
Otherwise, it will become final.
Defendant will
be served with a copy of this Minute Order at the
aforementioned address.
Defendant did not move to set aside.

Shortly thereafter the

plaintiff moved for the entry of the default judgment.
notice ever reached the defendant of this judgment.

No

Eventually

after the defendant learned of the judgment against him,
he moved to set it aside.

His Motion was denied, and an appeal

was taken to the Supreme Court of Hawaii.

That Court

stated that the turning point of the entire case was whether
or not the defendant ever received a copy of the Minute Order
requiring him to set aside the judgment within thirty days.
The Court concluded that the defendant had not been served
with a Minute Order as directed and that, therefore, the defendant had been denied the opportunity to defend himself.
Furthermore, the Court stated:
Though an attorney be warranted in withdrawing,
he should do so on reasonable notice to the client,
allowing him time to employ another lawyer.
the withdrawing attorney did not state in his
withdrawing papers that he had notified his client
of his withdrawal and according to the statement
attribute<l to him in the minutes of December 15, 1958,
he neither had done nor attempted to do so.
As a result of this fact,

the Supreme Court concluded:

In the present record, the case is one in which
the Court allowed counsel for the defendant to
withdraw on the day of pretrial knowing that the
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defendant had left the state and had not
been notified of the hearing or of the withdrawal of his counsel, and intending t~e
defendant be defaulted for the nonattention to
the case resulting from the withdrawal so permitted. Though the Court contemplated that service of the Minute Order would save the defendant's
right to defend, the Order was not served as now
appears. There was nothing in the record showing
service of the Minute Order of December 15, 19~8,
as directed. Upon the argument in this Court,
plaintiff's attorney stated that he did not send
defendant a copy and arg11ed that the Clerk was
descended.· As whether the Court should presume that
the Clerk sent it, plaintiff's attorney made no
such contention.
Furthermore, the Court stated that in this case the defendant
had made his Motion to Set Asine the Judgment under Federal
Rule 60(b)(6) within a reasonable time and that the one-year
limitation did not apply under the circumstances.

If anything

is to be gleaned from this case it is that attorney withdrawal,
even with the oerrnission of the Court, but without notice to
his client, deprives the client of an opportunity to defend
himself and that a motion to set aside a judgment made within
a reasonable time, even if beyond the

one~year

time

l~~it

in

the rule, will he granted in the interest of justice.
7.

In Tahoe Village Realty v. Desmet, 590 P.2d. 1158

(Nev. 1979), a number of factual matters exist that distinguish
that case from the Swapp case before this Court.

In De Smet

the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's denial of relief
from the Default Judgment.

However, in that case the pleading

which the withdrawing attorney failed to file was not a dis-
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covery pleading, but a responsive pleading. Furthermore,

in

making their Motion to Set Aside the Default Ji1dgrnent, the
defendants did not assert that their failure to respond resulted
from the mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or excusable neglect
on the part of counsel.

Moreover, they also failed to set

out a meritorious defense to the plaintiff's claim for fraud,
which was required under the Rules of Nevada.

The Court as a

result of these factors, which are very different from the
facts of the case before this Court, held that "the grounds for
setting aside a default judgment were not met and that the
District Court did not abuse its disgression by refusing to
set it aside."

Again the opinion of the Appellate Court turns

upon specific facts which are very different from the facts
in the present case.
8.

Finally, in Williams v. Five Platters, Inc., 510 F. 2d

963 (United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 1975),
the Court affirmed the Order Denying Relief from a Default
Judgment.

But in that case, the appellant argued that his

failure to file a brief in answer to the Motion for Summary
Judgmen~

was, as set forth in the Affidavit of his attorney,

due to the attorney's absence from his office, pressure
of other work in the attorney's office, omission of the matter
from the attorney's docket, and inability of the attorney to
contact his client.

The Court determined:
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The reasons given by counsel are such as to
evidenced neglect, but not excusable neglect.
Absence from one's office and pressure of work
are common phenomena.
Lawyers who sit constantly
in their offices with little to do are unlikely
to be dealing with Rule 60(b) (1).
No reason was
offered in justification for omitting the matter
from the attorney's docket.
The alleged 'inability•
to contact Williams rested on one letter which went
unanswered. If Williams was a traveling entertainer
who left no forwarding addresses, that fact only
serves to indicate Williams personal neglect of
the matter.
Counsel's neglect of duty is not per se,
excusable neglect sufficient to entitle Williams
to a fourth day in Court·under Rule 60(b) (1).
Nor
is ignorance of due dates.
. There is, however, on this record, no fraud to be condoned.
Though Williams twice alleges fraud and was provided two opportunities to prove it, he declined
to do so.
This decision, too, rests upon circumstances very different
from those in the Swapp case.
of attorney abandonment.

Here there were no allegations

Moreover, the defendant there had

apparently had three previous opportunities to make his
case in Court, and the Court in forming the denial from relief of
judgment was simply refusing to Williams his "fourth day in
Court."
CONCLUSIONS
Thus, as a view of the cases cited by crossclaimant-responden
Tanglewood indicate, Courts will not grant relief from a default
and default judgment unless there is a showing of something
more than attorney "mistake" and "inadvertance."

And it is

precisely that showing that crossclaimant-appellant Swapp has
made on the record before this Court.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-18-

Because the impropriety of

s~app's

former attorney con-

stituted the "extraordinary" circumstances of "abandonment" and
"unofficial withdrawal," Swapp was denied an opportunity to
defend himself in the proceedings before the trial court. However, as soon as he was a?prised of the fact that he had been
abandoned, Swapp obtained new counsel and made his Motion to
Set Aside the Default Judgment against him under Ruly 60(b) (7),
on grounds that the abandonment he had suffered by his attorney
constituted, not "mistake,

inadvertance, surprise or excusable

neglect," but "other reasons justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment" allowing him, therefore, to bring his Motion
To Set Aside beyond the three-month time limit, within a
reasonable time.
For the reasons stated herein and in the crossclairnantappellant's Appeal Brief, Reid Swapp seeks from this Court
relief from the Default and the Default Judgment filed against
him, as well as relief from the Execution predicated thereon.
DATED this

·J ,.,)
?

r-'t day

of April, 1982.
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MAILING CBRTIFICATE
MAILED a true and correct copy of the foregoing to:
Patricia M. Leath
John A. Snow
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
Suite 1600, 50 South Main Street
Sal~ Lake City, Uta 84144
Attorneys for Tanglewood SLC
Associates, Ltd.,
Crossclaimant-Respondent.
day of April, 1982.

postage prepaid this
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